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I AM A CAMERA:  SCRUTINIZING THE ASSUMPTION THAT 
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM FURNISH PUBLIC VALUE BY 
OPERATING AS A PROXY FOR THE PUBLIC 
Cristina Carmody Tilley∗ 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the public has a 
constitutional right of access to criminal trials and other proceedings, 
in large part because attendance at these events furnishes a number 
of public values.  The Court has suggested that the press operates as a 
proxy for the public in vindicating this open court guarantee.  That 
is, the Court has implied that any value that results from general pub-
lic attendance at trials is replicated when members of the media at-
tend and report on trials using the same means of perception as oth-
er members of the public. 
The concept of “press-as-proxy” has broken down, however, when 
the media has attempted to bring cameras into the court.  The addi-
tion of cameras to the experience is thought to change the identity of 
action between the public generally and the photographic press spe-
cifically during the trial process.  Despite its skepticism about camer-
as, the Court has held there is no constitutional bar to their admis-
sion at criminal trials.  But its wary acceptance of the technology has 
not translated into the recognition of a constitutional right to bring 
cameras into courts.  Instead, the Justices have developed a sort of 
constitutional demilitarized zone, in which cameras are neither pro-
hibited nor mandated.  Individual states may adopt camera admis-
sions policies that reflect their policy preferences.  State rulemakers 
addressing the camera issue typically perform a cost-benefit analysis.  
The primary cost—possible interference with Sixth Amendment fair 
trial guarantees—has been provisionally disproven in a number of 
studies.  The primary benefit—achievement of the public values iden-
tified by the Court in the access cases—is typically assumed to exist 
but lacks empirical documentation.  The assumption of a public value 
is impliedly grounded in the press-as-proxy conceit:  if actual public 
attendance furnishes value and if the press is a viable proxy for the 
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public, and if the camera-bearing press functions identically to other 
media, then cameras must furnish relevant public values.  Using the 
conceit to prove public value, and survey data to prove a negligible 
public cost, every state has admitted cameras to one or more levels of 
their courts.1 
This Article does two things.  First, it examines the access cases to 
distill the specific values the Supreme Court has identified as relevant 
byproducts of open courtrooms; the possibility of realizing these val-
ues has dictated the constitutional scope of public access.  The values 
fall along a spectrum:  those this Article deems “information-
dependent” depend on the transmission of objective information, 
while those this Article deems “response-dependent” depend on sub-
jective citizen opinion and engagement.  Second, the Article scruti-
nizes the assumption that as long as cameras do not impose a demon-
strable fair trial cost, they achieve the relevant public values by virtue 
of the press-as-proxy conceit.  Studies suggest that, at least as current-
ly produced, television news with live footage is actually inferior to 
print, audio, or footage-free television at achieving the information-
dependent values the Court has identified as the basis for access.2  
These same studies indicate that it may be superior to other media at 
fostering opinion development and emotional engagement.  At a 
minimum, studies of typical television news demonstrate that it does 
not uniformly replicate the values furnished by the camera-free press.  
In other words, the press-as-proxy conceit is not valid for the camera-
bearing press. 
Dismantling the press-as-proxy conceit for cameras wipes out the 
underlying basis for existing state camera policies, most of which rely 
on the proxy as evidence of public value.  Further, it represents an 
obstacle to possible claims of a First Amendment right of the press to 
record and televise court proceedings.  The invalidity of the proxy 
does not mean that cameras are categorically incompatible with court 
proceedings, but it underlines the need for empirical research into 
claims that cameras should be admitted because they furnish public 
value.  The Article concludes that policymakers weighing the costs 
and benefits of camera admission—and courts weighing a First 
Amendment broadcast access right—are hamstrung by the lack of 
empirical research into the value of cameras in the courtroom.  The 
issue is timely.  A significant number of states continue to bar or ef-
fectively block trial court cameras, inviting continued pro-camera ef-
 
 1 See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 2 See infra Part IV. 
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forts.3  And the campaign for televising Supreme Court arguments 
and lower federal court trials continues unabated, despite the appar-
ent institutional resistance from the Justices and the Judicial Confer-
ence.4  Advocates frustrated by unsuccessful policy arguments for 
more camera access to the federal courts may eventually consider a 
constitutional argument as an alternate means of securing camera 
admission to these proceedings.5 
Part I of this Article reviews the Court’s public access cases to tease 
out the distinct public values that are thought to result from opening 
courtrooms.  These values include:  transmission of information, 
scrutiny of the legal system, checks on judicial abuse, discharge of cit-
izen duties, confidence in the system, and catharsis in response to 
significant community events.  These values serve both First Amend-
ment free speech goals and Sixth Amendment fair trial goals.  The 
first three values—referred to here as “information-dependent”—are 
more likely to be realized when members of the public receive objec-
tive information about the legal system, whereas the latter values—
referred to here as “response-dependent”—may emerge as a result of 
subjective opinion development and emotional engagement, even in 
the absence of objective information.  In its latter-day cases on access 
to court proceedings, the Court has conditioned that right on the his-
toric openness of the proceeding at issue and the positive contribu-
 
 3 See infra note 124.  As recently as February 2013, for instance, the Chief Judge of the New 
York State Court of Appeals asked legislators to amend state laws that now obstruct cam-
era use in the trial courts.  Michael Virtanen, N.Y. Chief Judge: Open Courts to Cameras 
Again, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETTE, Feb. 13, 2013. 
 4 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Bucking a Trend, Supreme Court Justices Reject Video Coverage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A15 (reporting that a number of Justices in the past two years 
have either reaffirmed their opposition to cameras or adopted an anti-camera stance con-
trary to their Senate confirmation testimony, and quoting one First Amendment expert 
who has called the opposition inconsistent with free speech values). 
 5 The possibility of forcing the Justices to accept a First Amendment right of cameras at 
oral argument is remote.  See Alicia M. Cohn, Justice Scalia:  Cameras in Supreme Court Would 
‘Miseducate’ Americans, HILL (July 26, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.thehill.com/video/in-
the-news/240519-justice-scalia-cameras-in-supreme-court-would-miseducate-americans 
(quoting Justice Scalia’s view that “[t]he First Amendment has nothing to do with wheth-
er we have to televise our proceedings”); Mike Dorf, Cameras in Courtrooms, DORF ON L. 
(Feb. 19, 2013, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/02/cameras-in-
courtrooms.html (observing that the Supreme Court is unlikely to find its own refusal to 
allow cameras at its proceedings to violate the First Amendment).  But as discussed infra 
notes 79–87 and accompanying text, the Court’s trial access cases open the door to a 
general argument that the First Amendment mandates some camera access rights, partic-
ularly at the trial level.  In fact, camera proponents denied admission to lower federal tri-
al courts have in the past made just this case, and have won general agreement on the 
point from at least one appeals court judge.  See infra note 87. 
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tion to the public values that would result from opening the proceed-
ing. 
Part II demonstrates the Court’s implicit assumption that the gen-
eral press operates as a proxy for the public when it attends and re-
ports on trials using the same means of perception and communica-
tion as members of the general public.  It then examines the Court’s 
differential treatment of cameras to show that the press-as-proxy con-
ceit comes undone when the media seek to film trials.  The link 
breaks because of the perceived unique costs associated with filming 
and televising court proceedings.  However, this Part demonstrates 
that in cases following the declaration that cameras are not a per se 
fair trial violation, the Court has left largely undisturbed the assump-
tion that cameras are an adequate proxy for the public on the benefit 
side of the ledger.  The inadvertent preservation of the proxy for the 
broadcast press gives rise to a presumption that courtroom cameras 
produce the same public values that justify general public access to 
courts. 
Part III shows that camera advocates have leaned heavily on the 
proxy in their campaign to change state court camera rules.  Advo-
cates consistently invoke the press-as-proxy conceit to suggest that 
camera recording of trials furnishes the same public benefits as tech-
nology-free media attendance at trials.  Policymakers adopting pro-
camera rules have followed suit, alluding to the public value of cam-
eras without scrutinizing the basis for the claim.  This equation—a 
documented absence of cost and an assumed benefit—has yielded a 
nationwide trend in favor of cameras. 
Part IV examines the accuracy of the broadcast-press-as-proxy 
conceit.  It reviews communications studies research into viewer re-
call, comprehension, and response to television news.  Studies indi-
cate that live footage used in television news does not add to—and in 
fact detracts from—viewer recall and understanding of information 
in a story.  This literature suggests that several of the public values 
thought to justify camera access to trials are demonstrably not 
achieved by television news featuring courtroom footage.  Conse-
quently, this Part indicates that the press-as-proxy conceit is deeply 
flawed for television news featuring live footage. 
The Article concludes that policymakers deciding whether camer-
as furnish a net public benefit cannot rely on the assumption that tel-
evision news featuring live footage is a proxy for public attendance at 
trials.  If the proxy is invalid as evidence of public value, those con-
sidering camera access—whether state rulemaking bodies weighing 
the soundness of a camera policy or courts asked to recognize a First 
Amendment right to film trials—require empirical studies of the like-
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lihood that actual television news reports integrating courtroom foot-
age furnish public value.  This type of study has been neglected to 
date, largely because the press-as-proxy conceit has been used in its 
place as proof of benefit.  The dismantling of the proxy highlights 
the urgent need for research on the efficacy of televised court pro-
ceedings in achieving public values. 
I.  THE PUBLIC VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH ACCESS TO COURTROOMS 
In a line of cases stretching from 19486 to 1986,7 the Supreme 
Court has considered multiple times the constitutional justifications 
for the “public trial” guarantee.  As a matter of text and history, the 
right was long grounded in the Sixth Amendment.8  For years, the 
Court interpreted the public trial right with primary reference to the 
protection of individual defendants, while acknowledging that public 
values were created as a byproduct of the right.9  But because a Sixth 
Amendment-centered right of access prioritizes a criminal defendant 
over the public generally, the Court has been asked several times to 
curtail public attendance—and media participation—where it is al-
leged to jeopardize fair trial rights.10  Eventually, the Court resolved 
this ongoing tension when it recognized a freestanding First 
Amendment guarantee of public access to trials, subject to measures 
necessary to guarantee Sixth Amendment rights.11  Throughout the 
access cases, the Court has repeatedly stated that access is justified 
because of its potential to furnish to the public specific, constitution-
ally prized, values.12  These values are public information; public scru-
tiny of the legal system; checks on judicial abuse; citizen participation 
in government; public confidence in the legal system; and communi-
ty therapy in response to significant events.13  Having expanded the 
access right from a pure Sixth Amendment mechanism to a com-
bined Sixth Amendment-First Amendment mechanism, the Court 
eventually suggested that First Amendment-based access claims 
 
 6 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
 7 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 8 See infra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra Part I.B. 
 13 See infra Part I.B. 
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turned on the likelihood that access would make a “positive contribu-
tion” to the public values.14 
A.  Public Access:  The Sixth Amendment Baseline and the First Amendment 
Enhancement 
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial.”15  After the federal government adopted a public trial guaran-
tee in 1791, most states followed suit with similar state constitutional 
provisions.16  In 1948, based on the Sixth Amendment public trial 
guarantee, the Court invalidated the conviction of a petitioner who 
was tried and convicted in the chambers of a Michigan judge acting 
pursuant to the state’s “One-Man Grand Jury” mechanism.17  At a 
minimum, the Court suggested, the public trial guarantee meant that 
“relatives, friends, and counsel” of a defendant were entitled to at-
tend his trial.18  How far beyond this group the Sixth Amendment 
mandate extended the scope of the “public” entitled to attend was 
unclear.  In other settings, the Court had signaled that the guarantee 
was widely available—it observed in a case affirming the right of trial 
attendees to report on what they saw and heard in the courtroom, it 
observed that “[w]hat transpires in the courtroom is public proper-
ty.”19  Despite this generous description, the derivation of the right 
from the defendant-protective Sixth Amendment left open the possi-
bility that segments of the public unaligned with the defendant could 
be excluded consistent with the Sixth Amendment. 
The Court tackled that issue in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, where a 
trial judge closed a pretrial suppression hearing at the unopposed 
request of a murder defendant.20  The Court determined that the 
Sixth Amendment “public trial” guarantee was held by the defendant 
and not by individual members of the public such as the journalists 
who challenged the closure after the fact.21  The decision, which drew 
three concurrences and a partial dissent from four members of the 
 
 14 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 16 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267 (1948). 
 17 Id. at 260. 
 18 Id. at 271–72. 
 19 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
 20 443 U.S. 368, 376 (1979). 
 21 Id. at 379. 
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Court, was widely decried by commentators.22  Many complained that 
if the access right was held exclusively by the defendant, he could 
waive it and thereby effectively shut the public out of the court pro-
ceeding.23 
Just a year later, the Court responded to these complaints and its 
own internal divisions by dramatically expanding the constitutional 
foundation of the public trial guarantee.  The public at large held a 
distinct right of access to trials, it determined, by virtue of the First 
Amendment.24  The rights of free speech, press, and assembly assure a 
“right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal 
trials have long been.”25 At the same time, the Court held that upon a 
finding that openness could compromise fairness, public access 
might have to give way.26 
After identifying this First Amendment-derived basis for the open 
trial guarantee, the Court eventually extended the open trial guaran-
tee to voir dire27 and some preliminary criminal hearings;28 it has also 
remarked in dicta that the presumption applied to civil as well as 
criminal proceedings.29 
B.  The Public Values Associated with Access to Court Proceedings 
In its cases establishing the scope of the public access right under 
the Sixth and First Amendments, the Court has discussed repeatedly 
the values that can be realized when the public has access to trials.30  
Roughly categorized, they include public information, public scruti-
 
 22 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the 
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1568–69 (2010) (describing media criticism of the De-
Pasquale decision). 
 23 Bill Barnhart, Justice Stevens and the News Media:  An Exercise in Exposition, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 657, 684–85 (2012). 
 24 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 25 Id. at 577. 
 26 Id. at 581 n.18. 
 27 Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1984). 
 28 Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. 1, 9–14 (1986). 
 29 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (plurality opinion). 
 30 See infra notes 32–69 and accompanying text.  Moreover, constitutional imperatives are 
satisfied if the courtroom is open and creates the opportunity for public value, whether 
or not the value actually materializes in any particular proceeding.  See, e.g., Nixon v. 
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) (“The requirement of a public trial is 
satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and 
to report what they have observed.”). 
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ny, checks on judicial abuse, discharge of citizen duties, public confi-
dence, and community therapeutic value.31  Each is discussed below. 
Conveyance of Information to the Public.  The Court has noted repeat-
edly that open trials are beneficial because they provide to the public 
information about how the courts and legal system function.  In Estes 
v. Texas, despite finding that the media had overreached in the case 
before him, Justice John Marshall Harlan II stated that “[m]any trials 
are newsworthy.”32  Sheppard v. Maxwell, overturning the denial of a 
habeas petition filed by a murder defendant convicted after intense 
and unruly media behavior in the courtroom, nevertheless echoed 
this point.33  The Court observed that the press has a role in judicial 
administration because it “publish[es] information about trials.”34  In 
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, the Court reversed a state trial judge’s 
gag order on the press, extending protection for “[t]ruthful reports 
of public judicial proceedings” that inform the public.35  Concurring 
in the judgment, Justice William Brennan extolled the press for con-
tributing to “public understanding of the rule of law and to compre-
hension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system.”36  In 
DePasquale, the Court denied that the general public had a Sixth 
Amendment right to attend trials, but observed that public trial ac-
cess was nevertheless valuable because it “[gave] the public an oppor-
tunity to observe the judicial system.”37  The dissenters in that case 
agreed that crime, prosecutions, and the judicial proceedings sur-
rounding them are legitimate matters of public concern, and that 
open trials “provide a means for citizens to obtain information about 
the criminal justice system.”38 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
recognizing a First Amendment foundation for a public access right, 
the Court repeated that opening trials leads to “public understanding 
of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the en-
 
 31 In a single stray dictum, Chief Justice Burger mentioned that trials were historically a way 
to “pass[] the time” as a form of entertainment, but as that justification appears just once 
and is not developed throughout the cases, its weight as a policy basis for opening trials 
seems slight.  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion) (quoting 6 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834, at 436 (James H. Chad-
bourn rev., 1976)). 
 32 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 33 384 U.S. 333, 338 (1966). 
 34 Id. at 350. 
 35 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 36 Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
 37 Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979). 
 38 Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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tire criminal justice system;”39 this public information function was 
thought to operate both with regard to “the system in general and its 
workings in a particular case.”40 
Public Scrutiny.  The Court has suggested that public access to trials 
can lead to public scrutiny of individual proceedings and of the crim-
inal justice system as a whole. 
The trial-specific value of public scrutiny was introduced in In re 
Oliver.41  The Court amplified the theme in DePasquale, when it de-
termined that the guarantee of openness in the Sixth Amendment 
was designed for the benefit of the individual defendant in each trial.  
The public was on hand during criminal trials to “see [that the ac-
cused was] fairly dealt with and . . . [to] keep his triers keenly alive 
to . . . the importance of their functions.”42  Richmond Newspapers reaf-
firmed this trial-specific public scrutiny value, noting that public at-
tendance historically “gave assurance that the proceedings were con-
ducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the 
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or par-
tiality.”43 
A second “scrutiny” value, focusing on oversight of the criminal 
justice system as an institution, also arises in the access cases.  Effec-
tively granting habeas review in Sheppard because of media run amok, 
the Court observed that the press was typically an integral part of ef-
fective judicial administration because it “subject[s] the police, pros-
ecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criti-
cism.”44  This theme is one of the most prominent throughout the 
access cases.  In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, when the Court con-
doned the publication of a rape victim’s name after it was circulated 
in open court, it remarked that “the function of the press . . . bring[s] 
to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administra-
tion of justice.”45  It appears in Nebraska Press Ass’n, when the Court 
 
 39 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 40 Id. at 572.  Notably, at least one Justice has taken issue with a “public education” justifica-
tion for courtroom access premised on merely acquainting the public with the trial pro-
cess.  “[T]he function of a trial is not to provide an educational experience; and there is a 
serious danger that any attempt to use a trial as an educational tool will both divert it 
from its proper purpose and lead to suspicions concerning the integrity of the trial pro-
cess,” worried Chief Justice Warren.  Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 575 (1965) (Warren, 
C.J., concurring). 
 41 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). 
 42 443 U.S. at 380 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.25). 
 43 448 U.S. at 569 (plurality opinion). 
 44 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 
 45 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). 
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said that “truthful reports of public judicial proceedings [by the 
press] . . . subject[] the . . . judicial process[] to . . . public scrutiny 
and criticism.”46  Justice Brennan added in concurrence that press 
coverage of public trials can “improve the quality of [the justice] sys-
tem by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public 
accountability.”47  It appears in DePasquale, where the Court declined 
to find an access right held by the public but acknowledged that 
“[o]penness in court proceedings may improve the quality of testi-
mony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant tes-
timony, [and] cause all trial participants to perform their duties more 
conscientiously.”48  The DePasquale minority specifically asserted that 
access was not for the benefit of the accused, but instead to allow for 
a public quality control function over the criminal justice system as a 
whole; Bentham had argued that public trials “relat[ed] to the integ-
rity of the trial process,” and the minority agreed that they “safeguard 
the integrity of the courts.”49  Richmond Newspapers repeated the justi-
fication that openness guaranteed systemic public scrutiny, because 
media presence “historically has been thought to enhance the integ-
rity and quality of what takes place.”50  Concurring in the judgment, 
Justice Brennan said that “[p]ublicity serves to advance several of the 
particular purposes of . . . the judicial[] process.  Open trials play a 
fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our judicial system to 
assure [fair proceedings].”51 
Checks on Judicial Abuse.  The Court has emphasized repeatedly 
that open court proceedings furnish an antidote to judicial abuses.  
Preventing or responding to judicial abuse arguably overlaps with the 
public scrutiny values, but the Court has highlighted it as a specific 
value.  The Court has noted more than once that Bentham concep-
tualized open trials as a check on possible judicial abuse.52  In Rich-
mond Newspapers, Justice Brennan pointed out that the threat of judi-
cial abuse of power is offset by “contemporaneous review in the 
forum of public opinion.”53 
 
 46 427 U.S. 539, 559–60 (1976). 
 47 Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
 48 Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979). 
 49 Id. at 423, 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 50 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 51 Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 52 Id. at 589–90; DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 53 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).  But 
see infra note 77 (questioning whether consideration of public opinion is appropriate in 
judicial decision making). 
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Discharge of Citizen Duties.  The Court has often suggested that 
open access to trials provides public value by giving citizens the in-
formation and motivation necessary to effectively participate in gov-
ernment.  In his DePasquale concurrence, Justice Lewis Powell argued 
that open courtrooms give citizens access to “information needed for 
the intelligent discharge of . . . political responsibilities.”54  The dis-
senters in DePasquale agreed that opening courtrooms produced in-
formation on crime, prosecutions and judicial proceedings essential 
in order for citizens to weigh in on “public business.”55  They ob-
served that open trials serve “an important educative role” because 
“[j]udges, prosecutors, and police officials often are elected or are 
subject to some control by elected officials, and a main source of in-
formation about how these officials perform is the open trial.”56  Con-
curring in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan stated that “valuable 
public debate . . . must be informed,”57 and added that because adjudi-
cating cases is a governmental function, citizens have a stake in know-
ing about it. 
Public Confidence.  The notion that open trials further public con-
fidence in the legitimacy of the judicial system was articulated in Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun’s DePasquale dissent, to bolster the minority view 
that the Sixth Amendment open trial guarantee was held by the pub-
lic as well as the accused.  He explained that public witness to the ap-
pearance that justice was being done was essential to “public confi-
dence” in “the rule of law and in the operation of courts.”58 A 
plurality of the Court embraced the “public confidence” justification 
for opening trials in Richmond Newspapers.  Public trials lead to ac-
ceptance of “the process and its results,” which leads to “confidence 
in judicial remedies.”59  Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan 
agreed that in a civilization “founded upon principles of ordered lib-
erty,” the community must “share the conviction that they are gov-
erned equitably.”60  Declaring that cameras were not a per se violation 
of the Sixth Amendment, the Court repeated this theme in Chandler 
v. Florida, citing the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that tele-
 
 54 443 U.S. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 
863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 55 Id. at 412–13 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cox 
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975)). 
 56 Id. at 428. 
 57 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). 
 58 DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 59 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571–72 (plurality opinion) (quoting 6 WIGMORE, supra 
note 31, § 1834, at 438). 
 60 Id. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
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vised proceedings would lead to public “confidence in the [trial] 
process.”61  Notably, language in these opinions suggests that as with 
the “public scrutiny” value, the “public confidence” designed to be 
achieved by open courtrooms denotes confidence in the system as a 
whole, as well as confidence in particular trial outcomes.62  The Court 
has theorized that the public would be more accepting of even un-
popular results in specific cases if they resulted from open, rather 
than closed, proceedings.63 
Community Therapy.  The Court fully elaborated the value of com-
munity therapy or social catharsis in Richmond Newspapers, stating that 
public trials had an important “therapeutic” function.  Public trials 
provide an outlet for the community impulse to vengeance in re-
sponse to a “shocking crime,” the Court said.64  It pointed to expert 
views that “[t]he accusation and conviction or acquittal, as much 
perhaps as the execution of punishment, operat[e] to restore the im-
balance which was created by the offense or public charge, to reaf-
firm the temporarily lost feeling of security and perhaps, to satisfy 
that latent ‘urge to punish.’”65  The Court suggested that because 
community members have ceded to the state the function of impos-
ing punishment, they need assurance that the state is carrying out 
that function in order to secure the continued acquiescence in the 
state monopoly on violence.66  Although this theory was fully articu-
lated in Richmond Newspapers, the Court had subtly alluded to it in 
previous cases.  For instance, mentions of a “proper public interest in 
[the] testimony” of the accused67 and to the need for public confi-
dence in the “ability of the courts to administer the criminal laws,”68 
 
 61 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 565 (1981) (citing In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Sta-
tions, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla. 1979)). 
 62 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion) (“People in an open society do 
not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what 
they are prohibited from observing.”). 
 63 Id. at 571 (“A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where 
the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reac-
tion that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.”).  But see infra 
note 74 (discussing that many viewers of the Casey Anthony murder trial were convinced 
after following the trial that she had killed her child and were therefore outraged by the 
“not guilty” verdict, which apparently reflected jurors’ finding of insufficient evidence ra-
ther than actual innocence). 
 64 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion). 
 65 Id. (quoting Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1961)). 
 66 Id. (observing that a community unaware that society’s agreed response to a crime is “un-
derway” will be tempted to pursue vigilante justice). 
 67 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 68 Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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and “in the rule of law”69 seem targeted at the concept that the public 
is entitled to assurance that the state is properly conducting its role as 
enforcer of social norms. 
In sum, the Court has alluded to six distinct public values that are 
the goal and justification for allowing the public free access to crimi-
nal and civil trials, pretrial hearings, and voir dire.  The benefits de-
rived from public access to trials include conveyance of information 
about the justice system, public scrutiny of the justice system, checks 
on judicial abuse, citizen participation in the justice system, confi-
dence in the justice system, and community therapy in response to 
significant events. 
The six values can be fairly described as sitting along a spectrum.  
At one end are the information, scrutiny, and prevention of judicial 
abuse values, which will not materialize absent retention and com-
prehension of objective information about legal rules and legal ac-
tors—what can be called “information-dependent values.”  At the 
other end are the discharge of duties, public confidence, and com-
munity therapy values, which depend less on acquiring objective in-
formation and more on the development of subjective opinion and 
emotional engagement with the system—what can be called “re-
sponse-dependent values.” 
C.  The First Amendment Test for Expanding Access 
The Court has indicated that requests to expand the First 
Amendment access right to courtroom proceedings beyond the basic 
right to attend criminal trials, voir dire, and some preliminary hear-
ings are subject to two limiting principles.  In Globe Newspapers Co. v. 
Superior Court, decided two years after Richmond established a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, Justice Brennan noted 
that access to other court proceedings should be determined based 
on whether the proceeding was historically considered open70 and 
 
 69 Id. at 448. 
 70 The cases do not make clear whether the two-part test, historical pedigree and “signifi-
cant role” in self-government, is conjunctive or disjunctive, instead describing the consid-
erations as “complementary.”  Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (discussing the two con-
siderations that the Court has traditionally emphasized when dealing with claims of a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings).  Further, Press-Enterprise II suggests 
some disagreement over the kind of historical pedigree sought as a justification for ac-
cess.  The majority in that case found the historical consideration satisfied by a common-
law trend among multiple states to open pretrial proceedings to the public.  Id. at 10–11.  
In contrast, Justice Stevens in dissent suggested that the historical consideration requires 
the access at issue to have been part of the legal fabric at the time the First Amendment 
was adopted.  Id. at 22–23. 
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whether access to the proceeding would “play[] a particularly signifi-
cant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the govern-
ment as a whole.”71  The “significant role” as described by Brennan 
included “[p]ublic scrutiny,” “public respect for the judicial process,” 
“public . . . participat[ion],” and “checks [on] the judicial process”72 
—in short, what this Article has described as the public values.  Elab-
orating on the application of this test where an access claim is prem-
ised on the First Amendment, Justice John Paul Stevens explained 
that “a claim to access cannot succeed unless access makes a positive 
contribution to [the] process of self-governance,”73 an apparent ref-
erence to the public values that justify access.  This “positive contribu-
tion” consideration dictates that access will not be granted absent an 
indication that opening the proceeding may furnish a public value 
the Court has identified as relevant.74 
 
 71 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 74 The Court has not made clear whether realization of a single public value satisfies the 
“positive contribution” test, or whether multiple or even all of the values would have to be 
realized.  Notably, the information-dependent values are in some tension with the re-
sponse-development values.  At one end of the spectrum, the Court seems to be endors-
ing rational responses to court proceeding, while at the other, it acknowledges a place for 
emotional responses.  This conflict is not surprising, as it replicates an evolution in the 
Anglo-Saxon approach to appropriate methods of public decision-making in trials.  Trials 
were originally seen as opportunities for the public to develop and impose normative 
opinions about the accused without full consideration of the facts, as Chief Justice War-
ren observed in his Estes concurrence.  Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 557–58 (1965) (War-
ren, C.J., concurring).  But over time, the trial process evolved from 
[a] ritual practically devoid of rational justification to a fact-finding process, the 
acknowledged purpose of which is to provide a fair and reliable determination of 
guilt.   
      An element of rationality was introduced in the guilt-determining process in 
England over 600 years ago when a rudimentary trial by jury became the principal 
institution for criminal cases. 
  Id. at 557 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
      The modern disdain for emotional decisionmaking has been said to explain some 
judges’ instinctive opposition to televising trial footage: 
[P]rint is associated with rationality, while images are associated with irrationality.  
Reading and writing are understood to be one step removed from an event; there 
is a process involving thinking that occurs between a person and the event he or 
she is learning about. . . . Photographic images, on the other hand, appear to re-
produce reality, and can create an impression that one is actually experiencing the 
event being depicted.  Thus, images can create visceral reactions.  The imagined 
viewer of images—irrational, emotional—is opposed to the rational citizen imag-
ined by much of democratic theory. 
  Katrina Hoch, Images and Judges:  Why Cameras and Courtrooms Conflict 11–12 (Feb. 
11, 2008) (unpublished paper presented at the National Communication Association 
94th Annual Convention) (on file with the National Communication Association).   
        At the same time, the Court itself has specifically identified “community therapy”—an 
experience that is emotion-dependent—as one of the justifications for opening trials.  
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II.  THE PRESS-AS-PROXY CONCEIT:  ITS CONSTRUCTION AND ITS LIMITS 
In its access cases, the Court has stated that although access rights 
belong to the public, the press can and does serve as the custodian of 
those public rights in many circumstances.75  The Court seems to have 
accepted the press as a proxy for the public on the theory that indi-
vidual members of the press act no differently than individual mem-
bers of the public would in the same setting.76  In contrast, when the 
press has sought to behave unlike the public—specifically by record-
ing court proceedings with cameras and using the footage to com-
municate about those proceedings—the Court has not seen the press 
as a harmless stand-in.77  Instead, it has questioned whether institu-
tionally distinct behavior, camera use, imposes costs that mere public 
attendance would not.  As it has amassed experience with cameras, 
the Court has accepted that cameras do not impose costs in every cir-
cumstance.  But in the years following recognition of a general public 
 
Thus, the Court may be said to be working at cross-purposes in its development of the 
public values.  This tension complicates the inquiry into “positive contributions” made by 
the broadcast press.  As will be discussed infra at Part IV, television is inferior to other 
media at conveying specific objective facts, but superior in engaging emotions.  Because 
of the way that viewers process information, emotional news stories tend to interfere with 
cognition of objective information; in contrast, stories that convey complex or abstract in-
formation are considered dull and tend to be ignored.  A recent example makes the 
point:  according to several reports, the vast majority of those who followed the trial of 
Casey Anthony for the murder of her daughter were convinced that she had committed 
the crime and were outraged at the jury’s “not guilty” finding.  Andrew Malcolm, Casey 
Anthony Found Not Guilty; Twitter Erupts in Outrage, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2011, 12:41 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/07/casey-anthony-found-not-guilty-
twitter-erupts-in-outrage.html.  Jurors interviewed at the close of trial concluded that the 
state simply had not met its burden of proof.  Jamal Thalji & Leonora LaPeter, Casey An-
thony Juror #2 Says the Jury Wanted to Find Her Guilty, but the Evidence ‘Wasn’t There,’ TAMPA 
BAY TIMES (July 6, 2011, 8:11 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/casey-
anthony-juror-2-says-the-jury-wanted-to-find-her-guilty-but-the/1179177.  Thus, the jury’s 
legal conclusion was not necessarily inconsistent with the possibility that Anthony had ac-
tually taken her child’s life, but that subtlety eluded much of the viewing public.  Because 
television coverage of the case so successfully provided emotional engagement and com-
munity catharsis, but so poorly conveyed objective information about the legal system, it 
led to a disconnect that arguably undermined public confidence in the justice process.  
See, e.g., Hoch, supra, at 9 (“The on air audience will reach a conclusion and if the actual 
jury reaches a different conclusion, the audience may come to distrust the process of ju-
dicial administration.”). 
        Should the Court be asked to evaluate a First Amendment right to televise trial foot-
age, application of the Globe’s “positive contribution to public value” test might require 
the Court to explicitly prioritize among the information-oriented values and the emotion-
oriented values in order to determine whether television—a medium seemingly incapable 
of achieving both values simultaneously—clears the hurdle.  See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B. 
 75 See infra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 103–18 and accompanying text. 
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First Amendment right of access to courtrooms and the lifting of the 
Sixth Amendment prohibition on camera access, it has not clarified 
whether camera perception of, and communication about, court-
room proceedings are sufficiently similar to public perception and 
communication to sustain the proxy for the broadcast press in order 
to prove public value. 
The viability of the proxy is crucial.  At present, the Court has del-
egated to the states authority to decide for themselves as a matter of 
policy whether to admit cameras.78  If the proxy is not valid, the poli-
cies that have been promulgated in reliance on it are dubious. 
A less immediate but more important reason to examine the valid-
ity of the proxy is a constitutional one.  Having lifted the Sixth 
Amendment ban on cameras79 and recognized a general public First 
Amendment access right,80 the Court has opened the door to argu-
ments for a First Amendment right of camera access.  In two 1978 
cases, one involving camera access to prisons and one involving audi-
 
 78 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981).  Cameras are not permitted as a rule in 
federal courts, although federal rule-makers have permitted experimental camera access.  
Beginning in 1991, the Federal Judicial Center devised a three-year pilot program in 
which six district courts and two appellate courts were permitted to admit cameras.  
MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ELECTRONIC MEDIA 
COVERAGE OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS:  AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM IN 
SIX DISTRICT COURTS AND TWO COURTS OF APPEALS 1 (1994).  At the close of the pro-
gram, the Judicial Conference considered and rejected a recommendation to open all 
federal courts to camera coverage.  History of Cameras in the Federal Courts, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Multimedia/Cameras/history.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).  
Eventually, the Conference voted to allow every court of appeals to decide for itself 
whether to admit cameras; the Second and Ninth Circuits voted to permit camera cover-
age.  Id.  The Judicial Conference initiated a second experiment in 2011, providing for 
taped footage from fourteen federal courts to be uploaded onto a government website 
for public viewing.  See Cameras in Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Multimedia/Cameras.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).  Because cameras are generally 
prohibited in federal trial courts, whereas they are permitted in state courts that choose 
to admit them, this Article refers throughout to “states” and “state courts.”  However, if 
and when the Judicial Conference revisits the possibility of changing its rule to a pro-
camera presumption, the same argument made in the Article—that proof of public value 
requires independent evidence and cannot be provided by assuming that the broadcast 
press is a proxy for the public—would apply. 
        Interestingly, one might argue that some of the public values identified by the Court 
as the basis for public access to trials have less purchase in the federal setting.  Because 
Article III judges have life tenure and are intended to occupy a “special, countermajori-
tarian” position in government, public scrutiny of and exercise of duties with regard to 
federal judges may not be as salient as those values are for state court judges, who because 
of limited terms subject to reappointment or election are meant to be directly accounta-
ble to public opinion.  See Hoch, supra note 74, at 7. 
 79 Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575. 
 80 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597–98 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in judgment). 
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otaping of tapes played in open court, the Justices rejected First 
Amendment access rights for audio or videotaping devices.81  Howev-
er, those cases preceded the recognition of a First Amendment right 
to courtroom access82 and the clear elimination of a Sixth Amend-
ment camera ban.83  Those developments arguably throw a shadow on 
the earlier anti-camera rulings, decided when Sixth Amendment 
pressure against cameras was weightier and First Amendment inter-
ests in trial coverage were slighter.  Camera advocates have tried to 
exploit this constitutional uncertainty in the past.  The Florida court 
that adopted the camera policy challenged in Chandler was asked by 
the news media to declare a First Amendment right of camera ac-
cess.84  The state court rejected that argument but changed the rule 
nonetheless for policy reasons.85  Reviewing the Florida policy, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that a First Amendment argument had 
been made below, but conspicuously declined to comment.86  The 
question appears to remain open, and litigants have revived the ar-
gument from time to time in the federal courts of appeal.87  A First 
Amendment argument for camera admission would have to pass the 
complementary Globe tests of historical acceptance and positive con-
tribution to the public values to succeed.88  If the majority in Press-
 
 81 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1978) (plurality opinion); Nixon v. Warner 
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978). 
 82 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (plurality opinion). 
 83 Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575. 
 84 In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 774 (Fla. 1979). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Chandler, 449 U.S. at 569–70. 
 87 See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(denying CNN’s argument that it had a First Amendment right to film the libel trial of 
renowned General William Westmoreland against CBS); but see id. at 24 (Winter, J., con-
curring in judgment) (finding a First Amendment right of the press to film trials, bound-
ed in this case by legitimate time, place, or manner restrictions).  See also United States v. 
Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument of reporter that he had 
a First Amendment right to tape and televise the trial of former Louisiana Governor Ed-
win Edwards); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying 
press a First Amendment right to film the trial of federal judge Alcee Hastings). 
 88 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982).  Notably, well be-
fore the Court had established a First Amendment right of access to the courtroom in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), Justice Stewart sensed in 
his colleagues’ Estes opinions an expectation that the press should prove that its coverage 
furnished public value.  This expectation, borne out in Globe, struck him as impermissible 
censorship: 
While no First Amendment claim is made in this case, there are intimations in the 
opinions . . . which strike me as disturbingly alien to the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ guarantees against federal or state interference with the free com-
munication of information and ideas.  The suggestion that there are limits upon 
the public’s right to know what goes on in the courts causes me deep con-
cern.  The idea of imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of 
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Enterprise II was correct that “history” included prevailing trends 
among the states,89 cameras arguably clear that hurdle, having been 
admitted in at least one court in every state over the past several dec-
ades.90  The remaining question is whether they make a positive con-
tribution to the public values that underlie access.  If the proxy is val-
id, the answer is yes.  If the proxy is invalid, further proof would be 
needed to support a First Amendment camera access argument.  This 
Part reviews the history of the proxy, its suspension when cameras are 
at issue, and the possibility of its revival in light of a provisional con-
sensus that cameras do not threaten trial fairness. 
A.  Court Assumption That Press Acts as Proxy 
Throughout the line of cases assessing the rights of the press to 
access government locations and materials, the Court has repeatedly 
asserted that the press right of access is identical to the public right of 
access.91  Further, it has assumed that because reporters are members 
of the public employing the same modes of perception as the public, 
they effectively carry out their role as an agent of the public.  In fact, 
as seen in the Court’s discussion of public benefits in the access cases, 
it often refers to the benefits of public attendance and press coverage 
interchangeably.92 
 
justifying its presence is contrary to where I had always thought the presumption 
must lie in the area of First Amendment freedoms.  And the proposition that non-
participants in a trial might get the ‘wrong impression’ from unfettered reporting 
and commentary contains an invitation to censorship which I cannot accept. 
 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 614–15 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  
 Justice Stewart retired the year before the Court decided Globe, which established the 
positive contribution to public value requirement for requests to extend access beyond 
physical attendance at criminal trials.  Globe, 457 U.S. at 606. 
 89 Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1986). 
 90 See Cameras in the Court:  A State-by-State Guide, RADIO & TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N 
(Sept. 16, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.rtdna.org/article/cameras_in_the_court_a_state_
by_state_guide_updated (providing a summary of each state’s policies regarding the use 
of cameras and other electronic devices in courtrooms). 
 91 See infra notes 99–102. 
 92 Although the Court has emphasized that the press is entitled to the same rights as the 
general public to access courtrooms and other government institutions, it has never held 
that the press is entitled to access over and above that given to the public.  In Estes, the 
Court made clear that newspaper, television, and radio reporters all have the same privi-
lege to attend court proceedings:  “[a]ll are entitled to the same rights as the general 
public.”  381 U.S. at 540.  The Court reiterated this view in Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., holding 
that media requests for exceptions to a prison access policy would not be granted to pro-
vide additional media access.  417 U.S. 843, 849–50 (1974).  Justice Powell, dissenting, 
agreed that “neither any news organization nor reporters as individuals have constitu-
tional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens.”  417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J., 
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The notion that the press is an appropriate proxy to assert the 
public’s access rights appears to rest on two dynamics:  attendance 
limitation and perception replication. 
First, members of the press are, for institutional reasons, more 
likely to be physically present in the courtroom (or other government 
location) than are members of the public.  The media is tasked with 
attending trials and visiting government institutions, whereas the av-
erage American lacks the time, proximity and financial resources to 
be on hand.  “No individual can obtain for himself the information 
needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities.  
For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy 
events is hopelessly unrealistic,” Justice Powell, dissenting, observed 
in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.93  The point was repeated in Cox:  “[I]n 
a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources 
with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, 
he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient 
form the facts of those operations.”94  Concurring in DePasquale, Jus-
tice Powell repeated that “each individual member [of the public] 
cannot obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent 
discharge of his political responsibilities.”95 
Second, the Court has suggested that the press is an appropriate 
proxy for the public because reporters in the courtroom and else-
where will use the sensory powers of observation and communication 
that members of the public would have used if present.  “Those who 
see and hear what transpired [in the courtroom] can report it with 
impunity,” a plurality of the Court noted in Estes, quoting Craig v. 
Harney.96  Pointedly, it has described the press as the “eyes and ears” 
of the public.  “[T]he role of the media is important; acting as the 
‘eyes and ears’ of the public, they can be a powerful and constructive 
force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public busi-
ness.”97  For instance, where the media was present in open court to 
hear Richard Nixon’s White House tapes played and to view exhibits 
shown during testimony, the Court held that the public’s access rights 
were satisfied because the reporters “listen[ed] to the tapes,” read a 
 
dissenting).  “The underlying right is the right of the public generally,” he concluded.  Id. 
at 864. 
 93 Id. at 863. 
 94 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). 
 95 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 398 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 96 381 U.S. at 585 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 
(1947)). 
 97 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
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transcript of the tapes, and were able to “report on what [they had] 
heard.”98 
Taken together, these two dynamics have led the Court to treat 
the press as a proxy for the public in accessing courtrooms and other 
government proceedings.  Members of the Court have made the 
point repeatedly in the cases. 
In seeking out the news the press . . . acts as an agent of the public at 
large.  It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of in-
formation and ideas essential to intelligent self-government  . . . . The 
press is the necessary representative of the public’s interest . . . and the 
instrumentality which effects the public’s right.99   
“[P]eople now acquire [information about trials] chiefly through 
the print and electronic media.  In a sense, this validates the media 
claim of functioning as surrogates for the public . . . so that they may 
report what people in attendance have seen and heard.”100   
“[T]he institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief benefi-
ciary of a right of access because it serves as the ‘agent’ of interested 
citizens, and funnels information about trials to a large number of 
individuals.”101   
“[T]he press serves as the information-gathering agent of the pub-
lic . . . .”102  In sum, so long as the press is exercising ordinary human 
means of perception and communication, the Court has assumed 
that it is essentially identical to the public and necessarily able to vin-
dicate their access rights. 
B.  The Advent of Cameras and the Suspension of the Press-as-Proxy Conceit 
Although the Court has enthusiastically embraced the idea that 
the press operates as the public’s proxy to attend, observe and report 
on courtroom proceedings, it has balked when the media has asked 
to bring cameras along.  The proxy short-circuits, it appears, because 
the Court suspects technology has the potential to impose a unique 
cost:  it can distort trial processes and outcomes, and thus undermine 
Sixth Amendment interests.103  That is, although the press functions 
identically to the public when it uses ordinary means of perception to 
 
 98 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978). 
 99 DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863–64 
(Powell, J., dissenting)); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 39 n.36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863–64 (Powell, J., dissenting); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863–64 (Powell, J., dis-
senting). 
100 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
101 Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
102 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609. 
103 See infra notes 105–09. 
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observe and report on trials, it functions in a fashion distinct from 
the public when it uses technological means of perception to record 
and broadcast trials.  Cameras themselves, disaggregated from the 
public, have been subjected to a distinct constitutional analysis. 
The Court’s first foray into the issue, a review of a Texas fraud 
conviction challenged on Sixth Amendment grounds after pretrial 
and trial proceedings were televised,104 reveals a deep skepticism 
about cameras.  “It is common knowledge that ‘television . . . 
can . . . work profound changes in the behavior of the people it fo-
cuses on,’” the Court observed.105   
Those who see and hear what transpired [in a courtroom] can report it 
with impunity . . . [b]ut the television camera, like other technological 
innovations, is not entitled to pervade the lives of everyone in disregard 
of constitutionally protected rights. . . . Since the televising of criminal 
trials diverts the trial process from its proper end, it must be prohibit-
ed.106   
Concurring, Justice Harlan agreed, citing both the potential cost 
to a fair trial and the alien nature of the cameras themselves.  “[A]t its 
worst, television is capable of distorting the trial process so as to de-
prive it of fundamental fairness. . . . The rights to print and 
speak . . . do not embody an independent right to bring the mechan-
ical facilities of the broadcasting and printing industries into the 
courtroom.”107  Chief Justice Earl Warren objected to cameras because 
they could detract from the dignity of the court.  Televising trials 
might “cause the public to equate the trial process with the forms of 
entertainment regularly seen on television,” “to develop the personal-
ities of the trial participants, so as to give the proceedings more dra-
ma,” and ultimately, cause “the public [to] inherently distrust our sys-
tem of justice because of its intimate association with a commercial 
enterprise.”108  In the end, the Court in Estes overturned the convic-
tion at issue because of the cameras present at proceedings.109 
 
104 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534–35 (1965). 
105 Id. at 569 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (quoting Kenneth B. Keating, Not ‘Bonanza,’ not ‘Pey-
ton Place,’ but the U.S. Senate!, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1965 (Magazine), at 67, 72. 
106 Id. at 584–85 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
107 381 U.S. at 588–89 (Harlan, J., concurring).  On the other hand, Justice Harlan admitted 
that televising trials could furnish public value because these reports “might well provide 
the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying [trial] content to the public.  
Furthermore, television is capable of performing an education function by acquainting 
the public with the judicial process in action.”  Id. at 589. 
108 Id. at 574 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
109 Id. at 534–35 (majority opinion).  The actual holding of the case was ambiguous.  Four 
members of the Court seemed to find camera presence a per se constitutional violation.  
Justice Tom Clark authored the majority opinion; Chief Justice Warren and Justices Wil-
liam Douglas and Arthur Goldberg joined and concurred to underline the view that cam-
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In the following years, the Court dealt several times with media 
requests to use technology outside of the trial setting, where Sixth 
Amendment concerns were ostensibly absent and the benefit of cam-
eras might be expected to hold sway.  In those cases, too, the Court 
seemed inhospitable to camera use.  In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the 
media sought to take photographs at a county jail as part of its cover-
age of local prison conditions.110  The jail policy permitted the press 
and public to tour the facilities but prohibited cameras and other re-
cording devices.111  The Court upheld the prohibitions against a First 
Amendment challenge, finding that the public interest in jail facili-
ties did not justify a constitutional “right of the public or the media to 
enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving 
and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes.”112  Because the 
prison was entitled to control access to its facilities, and because it ex-
tended the same access to both the press and the public, the First 
Amendment was satisfied.113  Notably, the Court found persuasive the 
sheriff’s explanation that admitting cameras and expanding media 
access in other respects would impose a cost by undermining the 
primary purpose of the jail, securing inmates.114  A similar calculation 
was made in Nixon, where the media sought to make secondary copies 
of Richard Nixon’s White House tapes, which had been played in 
open court.115  Members of the media wanted their own copies of the 
sound recordings so that they could broadcast portions on the air, 
but the Court was unmoved.116  It held that the press, like other 
members of the general public, was entitled to hear the tapes in court 
but not to take physical custody of government evidence in order to 
make live broadcast possible.117  The Court held that constitutional 
access requirements were met by the airing of the tapes in open court 
and providing transcripts to all in attendance.118  In sum, when the 
 
eras were a per se Sixth Amendment violation.  Id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring).  Jus-
tices Stewart, Black, Brennan and White did not find it constitutionally problematic.  Id. 
at 602 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Justice Harlan, in concurrence, appeared to find the 
cameras a fair trial violation in the circumstances of the case without reaching a final 
conclusion that cameras were facially unconstitutional.  Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 
110 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
111 Id. at 5. 
112 Id. at 9. 
113 Id. at 6, 8–9. 
114 Id. at 5. 
115 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978). 
116 Id. at 609–10. 
117 Id. at 609. 
118 Id. 
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press initially asserted that its role as a proxy for the public’s access 
rights included a right to use mechanical means of perception and 
communication, the Court suspended the proxy and excluded the 
camera or audiotape device. 
C.  Opening the Door for a New Press-as-Proxy Conceit 
In 1980, the Court recognized a First Amendment basis for public 
access to trials in Richmond Newspapers.119  In 1981, the Justices retreat-
ed from their suggestion in Estes that cameras amounted to a per se 
Sixth Amendment violation.120  They held that absent conclusive evi-
dence that cameras inherently threatened trial fairness, there existed 
no constitutional basis for oversight of state court administrative au-
thority.121  In reaching its conclusion, the Court cited numerous stud-
ies conducted between Estes and the adoption of the Florida rule, all 
purporting to show that cameras did not necessarily alter the behav-
ior of trial participants and therefore did not as a matter of law dis-
tort trial outcomes and jeopardize Sixth Amendment fair trial guar-
antees.122  As a result, cameras were deemed constitutionally 
permissible.123 
Once the Court concluded that cameras were sufficiently cost-free 
to lift the facial Sixth Amendment prohibition, the press-as-proxy 
conceit would seem to suggest that camera-bearing press are entitled 
to the same access rights as camera-free press acting as the public’s 
agent.  The Court did not, however, make that constitutional leap.  
While it observed in Chandler that camera advocates had unsuccessful-
ly pressed the Florida Supreme Court to recognize such a right, it was 
silent on the question of a First Amendment camera right.  Instead, it 
referred the issue to the states for individual consideration on policy 
grounds.  The constitutional status of cameras was left for another 
 
119 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573–76 (1980). 
120 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 570–73 (1981). 
121 Id. at 582–83 (1981). 
122 Most of the studies involved were ex post surveys of parties who had participated in tele-
vised trials asking their self-assessment of the camera’s effect on their behavior.  See, e.g., 
Alex Kozinski & Robert Johnson, Of Cameras and Courtrooms, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1107, 1112–14 (2010) (summarizing study results that consist of surveys 
among jurors, judges, witnesses and attorneys who have participated in camera trials).  
These kinds of studies, which have been replicated many times in states considering cam-
era admission, have been described as unreliable.  See, e.g., Christo Lassiter, TV or not 
TV—That is the Question, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928, 966–67 (1996) (explaining 
that surveys are flawed because respondents are inherently biased in favor of believing 
that they participated objectively in a trial, and because of the small sample size involved 
in most such studies). 
123 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. at 582–83. 
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day, and camera advocates ran with the argument the Court expressly 
identified as the sole basis for camera admission:  cameras were good 
policy.124 
III.  INVOCATION OF THE PRESS-AS-PROXY CONCEIT TO PERSUADE 
POLICYMAKERS THAT CAMERA-ENHANCED NEWS COVERAGE FURNISHES 
PUBLIC VALUE 
In the onslaught of state camera initiatives that followed, the 
press-as-proxy conceit has been repeatedly invoked to furnish proof 
of public value.  Notably, the camera debate has long been framed as 
a straightforward cost-benefit measurement, weighing unfair trials 
against public value.125  Perhaps because Estes signaled that cost was 
the dispositive constitutional factor, camera advocates have worked 
hard over the years to prove that televised trials do not carry this 
cost.126  Public value was not seen as an obstacle, very possibly because 
of the Court’s general acquiescence in the press-as-proxy conceit.127  
 
124 Every state allows cameras in either its trial or appellate courts or both.  See supra note 90.  
However, in practice, a number of states continue to effectively block much coverage of 
trial court activity.  See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE COMM. OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY EXTENDED MEDIA COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS IN MARYLAND 12–13 (2008), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/
publications/pdfs/mediacoveragereport08.pdf (“[A]n express ban on extended coverage 
of criminal trial proceedings, or rules so restrictive as to effectively deny such coverage, 
remains intact in fifteen states, the District of Columbia, and in all federal trial courts.”).  
Further,  
[t]he rules and procedures of the 35 states that permit broadcast coverage of crim-
inal trials reveal tremendous variations as to the extent to which judges can permit 
or limit the coverage, whether and to what extent jurors can be shown, and the 
types of cases, such as sex offenses, family law, and trade secret matters, that are 
subject to mandatory exclusions.  It is, therefore, difficult to generalize as to prac-
tice in the courts of these states.   
      There are states as varied as Florida, which has a judicially created presump-
tion that camera coverage should be allowed in all cases; California, which express-
ly forbids such a presumption and grants the presiding judge broad discretion to 
permit or deny extended media coverage; and Rhode Island, which grants the trial 
judge absolute and unreviewable discretion to exclude electronic media from all 
or any part of a proceeding.  Many states prohibit coverage of pre-trial hearings 
and jury close-ups; others do not. 
. . . .  
      In 1997, the State of New York became the first state to rescind the media’s 
statutory license to bring cameras into the courtroom after its legislature refused 
to renew an experimental program it had sponsored for 10 years. 
  Id. at 13–15 (footnotes omitted). 
125 See Kozinski & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1114 (“[O]n balance there is more to be 
gained than lost by permitting electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings . . . .” 
(quoting In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla. 
1979)). 
126 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
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As a result, advocates seem to have taken the public value of cameras 
for granted, and offer virtually no proof that it exists.  As demonstrat-
ed below, members of the press, members of the bar, and state and 
federal court rulemaking bodies have made two consistent arguments 
on behalf of camera admission.  First, they contend that admission of 
cameras will necessarily achieve the public values identified by the 
Court.128  Second, they imply that cameras furnish public values be-
cause the taping and eventual television broadcast of trial footage is a 
close proxy for public attendance at, and communication about, tri-
als.129  Relying solely on this broadcast press-as-proxy conceit, they 
have persuaded policymakers that courtroom cameras furnish the 
same public value as general public and general press attendance at 
trials. 
A.  Camera Advocates Contend Televised Trials Furnish the Public Values 
Associated with Open Courtrooms 
In the years since the Supreme Court condoned camera admis-
sion, advocates from the press, the bar, and the academy have worked 
to persuade state and federal court rulemaking bodies that filming 
trials for later broadcast—whether in gavel-to-gavel coverage or for 
use as clips during standard television news coverage130—will furnish 
the same set of public values identified by the Court in its cases open-
ing court proceedings to the general public.  One report said that the 
media’s “most significant arguments” in favor of cameras is that they 
will drive public education and public confidence;131 that is, that they 
will furnish the information-dependent and response-dependent 
public values. 
The advocates’ position is summarized by Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski, who has argued that cameras are essen-
tial to letting the public “appreciate our justice system, and the legal 
 
128 See infra notes 132–49 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 150–56 and accompanying text. 
130 Part IV below focuses primarily on studies of standard television news, which feature very 
short clips of courtroom action within a story, usually clocking in at under two minutes.  
The viewer response to gavel-to-gavel coverage may be considerably different, but has not 
been studied extensively.  Moreover, typical use of camera footage is in short stories 
shown during half-hour or hour-long newscasts, rather than unfiltered, full-length trials.  
This Article suggests that policymakers require more fully developed empirical evidence 
about how the news media use courtroom footage.  Among the issues that should be doc-
umented is the proportion of trials that are televised in their entirety compared with 
those covered in short form during standard broadcasts. 
131 LEGISLATIVE COMM. OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 22. 
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regime that it upholds.”132  Three states in the forefront of the camera 
initiative, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Florida, all explained their deci-
sion to admit cameras by focusing on the public values presumed to 
be furnished by television coverage of court proceedings.  In its 1956 
decision to admit cameras to court proceedings, the Colorado Su-
preme Court pointed to the information conveyance and citizen dis-
charge of duties values to justify camera admissions.133  It observed 
that  
there is a constant regard for the necessity of educating and informing 
our people concerning the proper functioning of all three branches of 
government.  There is no field of governmental activity concerning 
which the people are as poorly informed as the field occupied by the ju-
diciary.   
      It is highly inconsistent to complain of the ignorance and apathy of 
voters and then to “close the windows of information through which they 
might observe and learn.”134   
Ruling in 1958 that the trial court had not abused its discretion in 
permitting camera coverage of a burglary trial, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court in Lyles v. State alluded to multiple public values:  public 
scrutiny generally, judicial oversight specifically, and conveyance of 
information about the legal system.135  Broadcast coverage of trials 
provided an antidote to secrecy and a safeguard against judicial abus-
es by allowing the public “to see how justice is done in the courts of 
their country,” the court held.136  Further, cameras “educat[e] and in-
form[] our people concerning the proper functioning of the 
courts. . . . There is no field of government about which the people 
know so little as they do about the courts.  There is no field of gov-
ernment about which they should know as much, as about their 
courts.”137  And the Florida Supreme Court, which adopted the cam-
era access policy that led to the Chandler decision, was swayed in part 
by arguments of its chief justice that televised broadcast of criminal 
trials could bolster public confidence in the system and provide 
community therapy.  In a speech later quoted back to the court by 
media petitioners, the justice had stated that televised “trials could be 
very helpful in making people familiar with the results of a criminal 
offense, [knowledge that might have] ‘a soothing influence’ on peo-
 
132 Kozinski & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1129. 
133 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 469 
(Colo. 1956). 
134 Id. 
135  330 P.2d 734, 742–43. 
136 Id. at 740.  
137 Id. at 742. 
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ple.”138  State court policymakers following suit after Chandler have 
agreed that televised court proceedings furnish the relevant public 
values.  Sharing the positive experience of the Iowa courts with cam-
era coverage of court proceedings, Iowa Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Mark Cady testified in 2011 that the benefits of expanded camera 
coverage would included “a well-informed citizenry,” and “[public] 
confidence in the courts,” driven by “the public’s understanding of 
our job and the information the public has about how we are doing 
our job. . . . [The media’s] efforts increase the visibility of . . . courts 
and . . . court procedures.”139  California Rule of Court 1.150140 gov-
erning camera admission instructs judges asked to permit cameras to 
consider, among other factors, the “importance of maintaining pub-
lic trust and confidence in the judicial system;” and “the importance 
of promoting public access to the judicial system.”141  The now-
defunct New York rule of court permitting cameras specifically stated 
that it was promulgated “to comport with the legislative finding that 
an enhanced public understanding of the judicial system is important 
in maintaining a high level of public confidence in the Judiciary.”142 
Judicial policymakers have concluded that courtroom cameras 
furnish public value in large part because media petitioners and bar 
group opinion leaders have told them so.  Recent examples are plen-
tiful.  Seeking to amend the rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona in 
2008, the Arizona Broadcasters Association, in comments, contended 
that allowing cameras in the court “will allow the broadcast media to 
provide better and more informative news coverage of judicial pro-
ceedings to the public.”143  Seeking camera admission in Maryland 
state court in 2008, Michelle Butt of WBAL-TV suggested that televi-
sion “‘vindicate[s] the community interest’ in the proceedings.”144  
Explaining the evolution in its policy since including a camera ban in 
the 1937 version of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, the ABA testified in 
 
138 Petition for Modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct at 14 n.18, 370 
So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979) (No. 46835). 
139 Access to the Court:  Televising the Supreme Court:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Over-
sight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10–11 (2011) (statement of 
Sup. Ct. of Iowa C.J. Mark Cady). 
140 CA. R. CT. 1.150. 
141 Id. 1.150(e)(3). 
142 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 131.1(a) (2012).  New York has since rescinded its 
rule permitting cameras in trial courts.  See supra note 124. 
143 Art Brooks, Comment to R-07-0016, Petition to Amend Rule 122, Rules of the Supreme Court, 
COURT RULES FORUM (May 15, 2008, 2:42 PM), http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/
AZSupremeCourtMain/AZCourtRulesMain/CourtRulesForumMain/CourtRulesForum/
tabid/91/forumid/7/postid/442/view/topic/Default.aspx. 
144 LEGISLATIVE COMM. OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 32. 
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a 2005 Senate hearing on cameras in the courtroom that “[c]ourts 
that conduct their business openly and under public scrutiny protect 
the integrity of the . . . judicial system by guaranteeing accountability 
to the people they serve.”145  Moreover, televised courtroom proceed-
ings “benefit the public because of the invaluable civic education that 
results when citizens witness federal courts in action. . . . [creating] 
informed, engaged and civic-minded citizens.”146  And, when the 
American Judicature Society adopted a pro-camera stance for federal 
court proceedings, it argued that the policy would provide the “pub-
lic understanding of . . . the [court] process” required to create “pub-
lic respect and support.”147  Further, extended television coverage  
can educate the public about what actually goes on in our courts . . . .  
let[ting the public] see for [itself] that, in fact, cases are routinely decid-
ed fairly and impartially, in accordance with the rule of law—that deci-
sions are reached based on the facts and the applicable law, without re-
gard to outside influences.148 
Finally, it said that “exposure assists in identifying and improving de-
ficiencies.”149 
B.  Camera Advocates Rely on the Press-as-Proxy Conceit to Prove That 
Broadcasting Court Proceedings Furnishes Public Value 
Advocates who assert that broadcast proceedings furnish public 
value often intimate that televised proceedings replicate the experi-
ence that members of the public would have if they attended trials in 
person.  In fact, some advocates argue that camera-enhanced report-
ing of court proceedings is superior to camera-free media coverage.  
As Kozinski has remarked,  
For the vast majority of the population—those lacking the time or re-
sources to travel to this out-of-the-way destination—the trial will be expe-
rienced, if at all, via second-hand accounts in the press. 
. . . [C]ameras have become an essential tool to give the public a full and 
fair picture of what goes on inside the courtrooms that they pay for.150 
 
145 Allowing Cameras and Electronic Media in the Courtroom:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ad-
min. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 69–70 (2000) 
(statement of Robert D. Evans, Dir. of Gov’t Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass’n). 
146 Letter from Robert D. Evans, Dir. of Gov’t Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Senator Arlen 
Specter, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Nov. 17 2005), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/letters/judiciary/051
117letter_cameras.authcheckdam.pdf. 




150 Kozinski & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1109. 
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In the petition asking Florida to admit cameras, Post-Newsweek ar-
gued that absent cameras, television trial coverage was reduced to 
film of “witnesses and lawyers entering and leaving the courthouse, 
jurors boarding buses, defendants and their families walking to lunch 
with wan smiles.”151  Camera footage, in contrast, would permit the 
media to “cover the actual events of the trial,” and the “drama of the 
courtroom will be more newsworthy than the reporter’s [stand-up] 
account of events.”152  An Arizona television station seeking camera 
admission stated that “[television] coverage is the most direct and ac-
curate tool available to allow citizens who cannot attend courtroom 
proceedings in person to see for themselves what transpires in the 
courtroom and observe the administration of justice first-hand.”153  
The editor of the Arizona Republic, seeking art for the news pages 
and video for the paper’s on-line edition, agreed that  
[t]he public has come to rely on visual images as an information source 
more than ever before.  Newspaper readership surveys show that readers 
are increasingly pressed for time.  Photographs help the public process 
information and draw attention to important articles.  On the Internet, 
camera coverage provides an in-depth source of information for readers 
who want to go beyond the information presented in the print edition.  
Photographs convey moods and emotions that are often difficult to cap-
ture with text alone.154 
Absent cameras, “the public is often deprived of photographic news 
reports, which sometimes can be the most efficient means of learning 
about the inner workings of the judicial system.”155 
 
151 Petition for Modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct at 14 n.18, In re 
Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979) (No. 46835). 
152 Id. at 11. 
153 Brief for Petitioner at 8, In re Petition to Amend Rule 122, Rules of the Supreme Court of 
Arizona (Ariz. 2007) (No. R-07-0016), available at http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/
Portals/0/NTForums_Attach/1117234892158.pdf. 
154 See rlovely, Comment to R-07-0016, Petition to Amend Rule 122, Rules of the Supreme Court, 
COURT RULES FORUM (May 19, 2008, 12:47 PM), http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/
AZSupremeCourtMain/AZCourtRulesMain/CourtRulesForumMain/CourtRulesForum/
tabid/91/forumid/7/postid/442/view/topic/Default.aspx (statement of Arizona Republic 
Editor Randy Lovely). 
155 Id.  In one of the very few efforts to document the asserted role of the press as proxy in 
furnishing public value, Lovely said that “studies have concluded that camera coverage 
improves the public’s knowledge of the judiciary and helps citizens relate the legal system 
to their everyday lives.”  Id.  The “studies” he cited were reports prepared by camera pro-
ponents expressing their view that televised coverage of courts would furnish public bene-
fits; none cited empirical evidence of how the media actually used footage or how viewers 
actually responded to it.  See Brief for Petitioner at 6, In re Petition to Amend Rule 122, 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona (2007) (No. R-07-0016) (citing In re Petition of 
WMUR Channel 9, 813 A.2d 455, 460 (N.H. 2002), available at 
http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/0/NTForums_Attach/1117234892158.pdf (citing 
opinions of camera proponents that televised trials furnish public value)); N.Y. STATE 
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The Colorado court seemed to agree that the broadcast press was 
a close proxy for the public, suggesting that cameras were a “window” 
through which observers could “observe and learn,” and that cameras 
would assure “people . . . free observation and the utmost freedom of 
discussion of the proceedings of public tribunals that is consistent 
with truth and decency tends to the public welfare.”156 
In sum, this selection of pro-camera arguments made and accept-
ed by state and federal court rulemakers reveals that while advocates 
have made broad claims about the public value furnished by court-
room cameras, these claims lack documentary proof.  Instead, advo-
cates rely almost exclusively on the assumption that the broadcast 
media act as a close proxy for the public, equal to the general press 
proxy endorsed by the Court.  Constructing their public policy argu-
ment in this fashion has placed significant weight on the viability of 
the broadcast-press-as-proxy conceit.  If it fails, advocates have virtual-
ly no proof of public value furnished by cameras.  As discussed below, 
empirical evidence on viewer response to television news reveals deep 
flaws in the broadcast-press-as-public-proxy conceit.  This casts doubt 
on the wisdom of camera admission policies and represents a steep 
barrier to the eventual recognition of a First Amendment right of 
camera access. 
IV.  DISPROVING THE PRESS-AS-PROXY CONCEIT IN CAMERA-ENHANCED 
NEWS COVERAGE 
The broadcast-press-as-proxy conceit—invoked by camera advo-
cates as far back as Estes157—seems uncontroversial and intuitive on its 
face:  “Of all the media of information, none portrays the courtroom 
scene, the spoken word and the appearance of the participants so ac-
curately as the television camera.  There is no chance for mistake or 
erroneous interpretation,” the camera advocates asserted in that 
case.158  Advocates have been implying for some time that cameras are 
inherently likely to realize public values in the same way that actual 
 
COMM. TO REVIEW AUDIO-VISUAL COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, AN OPEN 
COURTROOM:  CAMERAS IN NEW YORK COURTS 70–71 (1997) (summarizing views of cam-
era proponents that televised trials will furnish public value).  But see LEGISLATIVE COMM. 
OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 22–33 (finding that the only four 
available academic studies touching on the use of television footage to cover legal issues 
did not support the claim that cameras in the courtroom furnished “public value”). 
156 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 469–
70 (Colo. 1956). 
157 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
158 Brief for Respondent at 24, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (No. 256) 1965 WL 
115506, at *24. 
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public attendance or camera-free media would.159  But this implica-
tion wilts under empirical scrutiny.  As discussed in Part I, the list of 
public values identified by the Court as the goals and justifications of 
courtroom access falls into roughly two categories:  information-
dependent values and response-dependent values.  Television news is 
demonstrably worse than public attendance or camera-free media at 
transmitting objective information, and thus does not realize the in-
formation-dependent values.160  Why?  At least as currently produced, 
it appears to actually inhibit information comprehension and reten-
tion when compared with other media.161  Further, although televi-
sion generally has the power to drive viewer response, the production 
techniques used to present courtroom footage arguably drain the 
unique potency of the medium.162  This empirical background casts 
significant doubt on the broadcast-press-as-proxy conceit that camera 
advocates have been using to furnish proof of public value.  This Part 
analyzes current understandings of viewer response to television to 
demonstrate that the proxy is deeply flawed.  Without the proxy as an 
evidentiary crutch to prove public value, camera advocates must in-
dependently document value to justify camera admission as a desira-
ble policy, and a fortiori if they wish to argue in the future for a con-
stitutional right of access for cameras. 
A.  Television and the “Information-Dependent” Public Values 
Researchers agree that the baseline for measuring the efficacy of 
various types of television news against print or radio is to start with 
the verbal portion of the story; the text or script is considered the 
“target message,” while the visual portion of the story is contextual.163  
 
159 Id. 
160 See infra notes 163–200 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra notes 174–200 and accompanying text. 
162 See infra notes 201–12, 216, 219 and accompanying text. 
163 See, e.g., Doris A. Graber, Say It With Pictures, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85, 91 
(1996) (finding that audiovisuals add a new layer of information); W. Gill Woodall et al., 
From the Boob Tube to the Black Box:  Television News Comprehension from an Information Pro-
cessing Perspective, 27 J. BROADCASTING 1, 8 (1983) (“Thus, an episodic memory trace of 
television news could be made up of two parts:  the visual context (pictures, 
film/videotape images, diagrams, and graphs) and verbal information that constitutes the 
target.”).  One study revealed that twenty-one percent of viewers could not recall even 
one news item in a broadcast within one hour of its airing.  Kathy Kellerman, Memory Pro-
cesses in Media Effects, 12 COMM. RES. 83, 97–98 (1985).  Others have found that viewers re-
tain just thirty-four to thirty-eight percent of the information conveyed on television news.  
Id. at 98.  And, in a study sponsored by the National Association of Broadcasters, survey 
takers found that more than half the viewers they interviewed could not recall a single 
news story from a broadcast they had watched.  Id.  Another study found that six to seven 
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The impact of news can be assessed along two axes:  viewer recall and 
comprehension and viewer response.  Several studies have shown that 
given identical verbal texts, television viewers recall far less than print 
readers.164  In addition, correlational studies show that newspaper 
readers are much better informed than viewers of television news.165 
The cognitive information retention results are initially surprising, 
given current understandings of how information is stored in 
memory.  The prevalent theory, known as dual-coding, hypothesizes 
that “audiovisual information is stored in memory in two separate but 
associated codes—one verbal and one visual—whereas text-only in-
formation is stored in a verbal code only.  During recall, the visual 
memory code serves as an extra retrieval cue, which could enhance 
recall.”166  Therefore, because television (unlike print or radio) oper-
ates on both a verbal and visual level, it presents “dual-coding” oppor-
tunities and in theory, could achieve superior recall by viewers.167 
Further, one inherent characteristic of live footage—
concreteness—is generally thought to enhance recall.  “Concrete” in-
formation—information rich in detail and specifics about people and 
actions168—prompts deeper processing and is more likely to be re-
called, studies show.  For instance, one study showed that concrete 
nouns, such as dog or apple, are better recalled than abstract nouns, 
such as truth or justice.169  This dynamic would appear to give televi-
sion news a recall edge over print news, as studies suggest that pic-
tures can help viewers “concretize” abstract or unfamiliar concepts 
 
weeks after exposure, viewers had better recall of actual facts from stories without visual 
footage, and better recall of images from stories with visual footage.  John Newhagen & 
Byron Reeves, The Evening’s Bad News:  Effects of Compelling Negative Television News Images 
on Memory, 42 J. COMM. 25, 38 (1992).  Consequently, it is unsurprising that in election 
coverage, it was more likely that television viewers would be familiar with a candidate’s 
personal biography and personal qualities than his specific stands on issues, whereas 
newspaper readers were more likely to know of a political party’s positions on the issues.  
See Steven Chaffee & Stacey Frank, How Americans Get Political Information:  Print Versus 
Broadcast News, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 51–53 (1996) (comparing me-
dia and types of information people gain by accessing different source material). 
164 Juliette H. Walma van der Molen, Assessing Text-Picture Correspondence in Television News:  
The Development of a New Coding Scheme, 45 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 483, 483 
(2001); see also Prabu David, Role of Imagery in Recall of Deviant News, 73 JOURNALISM & 
MASS COMM. Q. 804, 806 (1996) (“Since deviance and imagery are very closely inter-
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tomatic activation in the visual subsystem from deviant and imagistic verbal stimuli.”). 
165 Walma van der Molen, supra note 164, at 483. 
166 Id. at 484. 
167 Id. (citing ALLAN PAIVIO, MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS:  A DUAL CODING APPROACH 146–50 
(1986)). 
168 Woodall et al., supra note 163, at 16. 
169 David, supra note 164, at 806. 
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and thus improve recall and comprehension.  For instance, one study 
found that pictures helped viewers recall subjects outside their nor-
mal experience, such as foreign affairs.170 
But television’s unique advantage over print—the ability to deploy 
visual images—does not seem to pay off consistently in improved re-
call when viewers are tested.  Although television news is able to con-
cretize unfamiliar or abstract information by giving viewers visual 
cues, researchers have found that “visuals are most frequently used to 
illustrate the person and place concrete details of news stories which 
viewers are most likely to remember anyway.”171  This may be a func-
tion of the relative ease of capturing visuals of people and places 
when compared with finding visuals that depict abstract concepts.  As 
one television pioneer remarked early on, “comings and goings make 
easy pictures; the issues usually do not.”172  And even concretizing vis-
uals appear to achieve limited recall of fine details.  One study 
showed that viewers watching “sound bites” of speakers recalled the 
gist of the speaker’s message but did not recall the speaker’s name, 
title, or political affiliation presented in subtitles on the screen while 
footage rolled.173 
Communications studies theories suggest that the gap between 
television’s unique educational potential and its actual inferiority to 
print results from limits on human ability to process divergent infor-
mational cues.  The limited-attentional-capacity theory instructs that a 
viewer required to process inconsistent verbal and visual cues will ex-
ceed his processing capacity and will default to the verbal cue.174  
However, the more visual and verbal information reinforce each oth-
er—a concept described as semantic overlap or redundancy—the bet-
ter the viewer recall.175  Semantic overlap exists in a televised newscast 
when the verbal information relayed to the viewer by an anchor or by 
a reporter stand-up or voiceover is consistent with or exemplifies the 
visual information presented in a still photo or moving image within 
 
170 Kellerman, supra note 163, at 102 (citing Allan Paivio, Mental Imagery in Association Learn-
ing and Memory, 76 PSYCH. REV. 241 (1969)). 
171 Woodall et al., supra note 163, at 16. 
172 Mickie Edwardson et al., Visualization and TV News Information Gain, 20 J. BROADCASTING 
373, 374 (1976) (quoting Robert MacNeil, The News on TV and How It is Unmade, 237 
HARPER’S MAG. 72, 75 (1968)) (discussing comments of former NBC board chairman 
Walter Scott). 
173 Mickie Edwardson et al., Audio Recall Immediately Following Video Change in Television News, 
36 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 395, 397, 407 (1992). 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., Juliette Walma van der Molen & Marlies E. Klijn, Recall of Television Versus Print 
News:  Retesting the Semantic Overlap Theory, 48 BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA  89, 90 
(2004) (summarizing the history of research on semantic overlap theory). 
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the story.176  When visual and verbal information is redundant, reten-
tion is greater than it would be for the same story without a visual.177  
For instance, a television news story on a gas shortage accompanied 
by footage of a line of cars at the pump will be recalled and under-
stood better than a verbal-only story on the same issue.178  However, 
where a visual has an attenuated or unclear link with the verbal, view-
ers can misunderstand the story as a whole.179  For instance, if the 
same gas line footage were used to accompany a story about the 
threat of war in the Middle East, it would be ripe for misunderstand-
ing.180  And, if the visual is actively inconsistent with the verbal, reten-
tion declines further; in fact, the retention rate drops below that for 
print news stories.181 
A leading study on semantic overlap is instructive.  That study pre-
sented readers with three different versions of three different news 
stories.182  The first story was on a state visit by Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin to Egypt to discuss reducing tension in the Middle East 
stemming from settlement policy in the occupied territories.183  The 
verbal cues for the story were consistent throughout the three exper-
imental versions of the story.184  The first version of the story was ac-
companied by pictures of Israeli settlements; the second, by pictures 
of an honor guard receiving Rabin, of him appearing with Egyptian 
officials before cameras and at a press conference; the third, by pic-
tures of Jewish children trying a new kosher soda.185  The second story 
involved Russian President Boris Yeltsin seeking economic assistance 
for Russia because of difficulties related to government reforms while 
at a worldwide summit meeting.186  Version one was accompanied by 
pictures of Russian shops and homes; version two, by pictures of Pres-
ident Yeltsin at a world economic summit meeting with other gov-
ernment leaders at a banquet and at a press conference; version 
three, by pictures of Yeltsin playing tennis and pictures of luxury 
goods.187  The third story involved a state visit by El Salvadoran Presi-
 
176 Hans-Bernd Brosius et al., How Do Text-Picture Relations Affect the Informational Effectiveness 
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dent José Napoleón Duarte to Germany, at which he discussed dis-
turbances and human rights abuses in El Salvador.188  Version one was 
accompanied by pictures of confrontations between protesters and 
government troops; version two, by pictures of Duarte arriving in 
Germany and of meetings and press conferences with German offi-
cials; and version three, by pictures of a fashion show and a press 
ball.189 
After viewing the newscast with all three items, subjects were asked 
both free recall and cued recall questions.  The cued recall questions 
were designed to test retention of specific information conveyed in 
the reports, such as “What was the reason for the Israeli prime minis-
ter’s journey to Egypt?” and “What is the Russian government doing 
to improve the current situation?”190  The questionnaire also asked 
the subjects for their general opinion on the topics covered, such as 
“How great are the prospects for a lasting peace in the Middle East?” 
and “Do you think that Yeltsin has the situation under control?”191  
For the free recall questions, those who saw the semantically overlap-
ping stories scored an average of 8.56, those who saw the standard 
picture stories scored an average of 6.36, and those who saw the text-
picture divergent stories scored an average of 5.04.192  A group who 
heard radio only scored 6.60, an insignificant difference from the 
standard picture group.193  The same ranking was found for cued re-
call—semantically overlapping stories were recalled best (10.16); 
standard picture stories were recalled less well and similar to picture-
less radio stories (7.16); and stories with text-picture divergence were 
recalled least well, and less well than verbal-only stories heard on the 
radio (5.80).194 
The researchers summarized that “[t]he common habit of TV 
journalists of using standard news pictures is not justified based on 
the present findings.  The advantage that a visual medium like televi-
sion offers for using pictures is only sensibly exploited when the pic-
tures illustrate the news text.”195 
The semantic divergence effect seems magnified when the visual 
image competing for attention is “vivid,” that is a picture or clip that 
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visuals arouse emotion and can galvanize action, as discussed in Part 
IV.B below, they detract from recall and understanding when they do 
not reinforce text.196  For example, a news story about traffic density 
in cities explained verbally that the two main problems that resulted 
were noise and air pollution.197  The accompanying footage showed 
children running into the road while a car approached.198  More than 
half those who watched the story later responded that child safety was 
the main problem to arise from urban traffic.199  As one expert has 
summarized, the studies indicate that “viewers caught up in the dra-
matic aspects of a story tend to lose sight of important complexities of 
the situation spelled out in the narrative.”200 
B.  Television and the “Response-Development” Values 
While viewers of standard television news are less likely to retain 
or understand objective information than those who use other media, 
studies indicate that television news may be more effective in leading 
viewers to take action or develop opinions than its non-visual media 
counterparts.201 
This phenomenon may be explained in part by television news’s 
preference for “vivid” visuals that “compel[] attention and encour-
age[] the creation of powerful mental images.”202  Vivid footage—
measured by its emotional interest, potential to trigger images, and 
sensory, spatial or temporal proximity—has been found to make a 
stronger impression on viewers than pallid information.203  For exam-
ple, the use of vivid imagery such as air crash footage and disaster 
footage can engage viewers and mobilize them to action.  Television 
viewers informed of an impending saltwater intrusion into the Missis-
sippi River in a story including vivid footage of shoppers buying water 
in bulk were more likely to stock up on bottled water than were 
newspaper readers informed of the same threat by stories including 
maps of Louisiana and still pictures of shoppers buying water.204 
 
196 Newhagen & Reeves, supra note 163, at 38. 
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The emotional charge carried by vivid television visuals can arouse 
viewers to pay more attention.  Perhaps for that reason, emotional 
footage has been seen as a “catalyst for political learning.”205  “Drama 
. . . inspires political action[,] . . . arouses empathy and spurs the will 
to help.”206  While recall of specifics from a television news story may 
be minimal, as discussed above in Part IV.A, in the long-term, viewers 
emerge with “general judgments about the content of an item.”207  
Television news can motivate citizen participation; one study showed 
that although reading print news is a greater predictor of citizen 
knowledge about party positions on issues, watching television news 
correlated with “voting on the basis of personal qualities” of candi-
dates.208 
Further, some of the most derided characteristics of television 
news—its tendency to sensationalize stories and incorporate “opin-
ionation” (whether opinions are introduced via anchor cross-talk or 
the integration of punditry into newscasts)—can actually provide cues 
to political action.  A 1981 study of local news in Houston showed 
that nearly half of the air time was devoted to sensational news.  
However, many of the facially sensational stories offered “opinion re-
sources.”209  These resources included instruction on how citizens 
could participate in a civic activity, information on how a political 
process operated, or broad background on a social issue relevant to a 
more specific story.210  In fact, sensational stories were more likely to 
include instruction on civic action than were non-sensational sto-
ries.211  In the same vein, opinionation in television news can improve 
engagement.  In a study, those who do not identify with a political 
party were more motivated to pay attention to discussions about the 
Iraq war when those discussions were not neutral but involved the 
expression of opinion about the war.212 
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In short, while television news has been shown inferior to other 
media in transmitting the objective information required for the 
Court’s information-dependent public values, it is ideally suited to 
achieve response-dependent values. 
C.  Replication of the Information-Conveyance and Opinion-Development 
Potential of Television News in Stories Using Courtroom Footage 
The studies surveyed above indicate that general television news 
featuring live footage or photos is worse than other media at convey-
ing information but potentially better at engaging emotion and de-
veloping opinion.  There is little specific data on whether the produc-
tion techniques that yield these results appear in trial-specific news 
stories that feature courtroom footage.  However, four broad studies 
that consider television trial coverage hint that trial stories feature the 
same characteristics that inhibit the transmission of information in 
other broadcast news. 
One study examined coverage from the trial of New York police 
officers charged with the murder of Amadou Diallo.213  The Diallo 
study considered newscasts from five local television stations over the 
twelve-day course of the trial.214  Researchers found that during 201 
newscasts aired during the twelve-day trial, the majority of the cover-
age “consisted of reporter or anchorperson voice-overs and footage 
from outside the courtroom.”215  The average story length was 3:35 
minutes, and on average each story contained seventy-eight seconds 
of courtroom footage; forty-seven seconds of the courtroom footage 
featured live sound, while thirty-one seconds were visual only, accom-
panied by a reporter voiceover.216  The study did not compare the vis-
ual and verbal messages to test for semantic overlap. 
Another study considered selected news stories that resulted from 
the 1994 federal pilot project allowing cameras in the courtroom.217  
Researchers reviewed ninety of the news stories featuring taped court 
 
213 Wendy Pogorzelski & Thomas W. Brewer, Cameras in Court:  How Television News Media Use 
Courtroom Footage, 91 JUDICATURE 124, 125 (2007). 
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footage that aired during the three-year pilot period.218  Of the news 
stories using courtroom clips, the clips occupied fifty-nine percent of 
the total air time with just thirty-seven percent of those clips featuring 
live sound and the balance using video only accompanied by a re-
porter voiceover.219  The study did not compare the verbal text and 
the visual cues to assess redundancy.  Sixty-two percent of the stories 
explained what the plaintiff sought to achieve by suing,220 and ninety-
four percent of those explanations were provided by reporters rather 
than by a clip of a participant stating those goals in the proceeding.221  
The study summarized that court footage was used to “add[] color or 
emotion rather than substance to the discussion” and that the stories 
did a “poor job of providing information to viewers about the legal 
process.”222 
A third notable study reviewed television reporting of civil litiga-
tion generally, without restricting the dataset to stories featuring 
filmed court proceedings.  This study covered eleven selected media 
markets in 2004 and nine Midwest media markets in 2006 and 2007.223  
Researchers found that where a story used videotape or still photog-
raphy, ten percent of the stories featured action in a courtroom (in-
cluding sketches in courts that did not allow cameras);224 the most 
common type of imagery to accompany stories was video or a photo-
graph of the harm that led to the suit.225 
A fourth study analyzed content of local television (both with and 
without court footage) and newspaper coverage of court proceedings 
in five different media markets.226  It found that television news is 
weighted more heavily towards violent crime coverage than newspa-
pers.227  Notably, it studied television coverage of the related criminal 
trials of John and Lorena Bobbitt.228  John was charged with sexually 
assaulting his wife; she, with genitally mutilating him after the alleged 
assault.229  His trial did not permit cameras; hers did.230  The research-
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ers found that the footage-free television coverage of essentially the 
same series of events integrated comments from experts on marital 
abuse and contextualized marital rape beyond the facts of the Bobbitt 
case.231  In contrast, television coverage of the trial where cameras 
were admitted was restricted to the events taking place in the court-
room.  “The sound bites from the networks ran as long as thirty se-
conds—an eternity when compared to the ten-second sound bites al-
lotted to the candidates during most of the presidential campaigns of 
the 1990s.”232  Further, the footage itself was emotionally charged.  
The inflections in [Lorena Bobbitt’s] voice and her dramatic pauses after 
each word built up tension that reached a peak on the final word of her 
sentence. . . . Instead of having the reporters mention that the witnesses 
had been emotional, television news showed Lorena Bobbitt crying and 
shaking on the witness stand.233 
While the second series of stories concentrated on courtroom tes-
timony, none of them addressed marital abuse as a societal topic, as 
the camera-free stories had done.234 
These studies suggest (in a very attenuated and preliminary way) 
that television news coverage of court proceedings using footage 
from in-court cameras is unlikely to furnish the information-
dependent public values identified by the Court as justifying access.  
The footage is generally reduced to a very short clip, and it seems 
that reporters often lay a voiceover on top of the live sound in the 
clip, increasing the opportunity for semantic divergence and decreas-
ing the likelihood of recall or comprehension.  Further, footage does 
not seem to be selected to enrich the informational content of cover-
age, but rather to enhance the emotional experience of watching the 
story.  And there is some evidence that when footage is available, re-
porters narrow their focus to in-court events rather than seeking to 
place stories in social context. 
On the other hand, the studies suggest that television news stories 
incorporating courtroom footage may be successful in furnishing the 
response-dependent public values identified by the Court.  Clips 
seem to be selected for their emotional weight and provocative con-
tent, and are thus more likely to engage viewers and to elicit a re-
sponse.  This conclusion is counterbalanced by evidence that while 
some stories present unvarnished clips of court proceedings—as in 
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the Lorena Bobbitt trial coverage—others use the footage as a visual 
backdrop for reporter voiceovers.  That production technique can 
sap the footage of its response-dependent value.  Most courtroom im-
ages capture a sitting witness or judge or a stationary attorney—these 
images are made engaging in large part because of the participants’ 
speech.  For instance, researchers examining the Bobbitt trial footage 
were impressed that her “voice and her dramatic pauses after each 
word built up tension that reached a peak on the final word of her 
sentence.”235  The majority of stories lose this component because the 
footage is accompanied by a reporter voiceover rather than by live 
sound. 
In sum, these studies give a very preliminary indication that televi-
sion news using courtroom footage, like other television news, typical-
ly pairs divergent words and pictures that confuse viewers, meaning 
that it does not make a significant contribution to the information-
dependent public values.  They illustrate that television has the po-
tential to contribute to response-dependent public values, but be-
cause the most vivid part of a televised court scene—the inflected 
words of the trial participants—is often suppressed to allow for re-
porter voiceovers, television footage of court scenes may lack the viv-
idness that is thought to drive the response-dependent public values 
in other television news.  The studies strongly suggest that the press-
as-proxy conceit is invalid for television news.  At the very least, they 
show that the proxy cannot be assumed in the absence of documen-
tary evidence that television news uses footage in ways likely to capi-
talize on either its information-dependent potential or its response-
dependent potential.  State camera rules generated in reliance on the 
proxy are therefore subject to policy-based criticisms.  And future 
First Amendment arguments for mandatory camera access at the state 
or federal level may be destined to fail if advocates robbed of the 
proxy cannot proffer freestanding evidence of a “positive contribu-
tion”236 to self-governance made by cameras. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has endorsed a hybrid Sixth Amendment-First 
Amendment right of the public to attend and discuss trials and other 
court proceedings.  Public attendance at trials is thought to furnish a 
variety of public values, some information-dependent (conveyance of 
 
235 Id. at 91. 
236 Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984). 
738 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
information, public scrutiny of the system, and checks on judicial 
abuse) and others response-dependent (discharge of citizen duties, 
public confidence in the system, and community therapy).  The 
Court has recognized that the press is an appropriate proxy for 
members of the public and that its presence at trials can help realize 
the public values that justify open access.  However, the Court has 
suspended the proxy when the press seeks to use cameras and other 
technological means of perception and communication.  This sus-
pension was initially motivated by fears that cameras would under-
mine Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantees.  That fear has been 
tamped down sufficiently to allow states latitude to adopt their own 
policies on cameras.  It might seem that absent a Sixth Amendment 
cost, camera-bearing press can invoke the press-as-proxy conceit to 
argue for a First Amendment right of access.  Armed with the Court’s 
non-constitutional blessing to seek policy-based access to state courts, 
advocates have not pressed the First Amendment access argument.  
Instead, they have successfully petitioned state courts to permit cam-
eras, by provisionally disproving a fair trial cost and invoking the 
proxy conceit as evidence of a public benefit. 
Communications studies literature indicates that the broadcast 
press is not a good proxy for the public.  Television news in general 
(and trial news specifically) does not deploy imagery to reinforce 
public understanding, but to detract from it.  As a result, it does not 
make a “significant contribution” to the information-dependent pub-
lic values.  Further, although television news has the potential to en-
gage citizens emotionally, production techniques that dampen the 
vivid qualities of courtroom footage mean that television is not suc-
cessful in achieving the response-dependent public values. 
The demonstrable invalidity of the press-as-proxy conceit for tele-
vised trials casts doubt on the public value furnished by cameras, and 
on the soundness of current state court camera policies.  And it spells 
doom for any First Amendment right of access.  Absent this 
longstanding proxy, policymakers and judges asked to expand court-
room camera programs should demand empirical evidence that tele-
vised trials furnish the public values that justify courtroom access. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
